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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELBERT B. RUMSEY,
Plaintiff and
vs.

)
Respondent~

\ Case No.
'

10181

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT, OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries to the
respondent resulting from an accident on a diving board
at the Wasatch Springs Plunge operated by the appellant.

DISPOSITION IN '"fHE LOWER COUR'"f
A judgment was entered by the Third Judicial
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, upon a jury verdict
3
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on M~y 18, 1964, in favor of the respondent and.against
the appellant.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGH'!, ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the judgment reversed
and the action dismissed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This cause c~a~·~--~e-the lower court, sitting with
a jury on the
ays of May, 1964, upon
the complaint of t e
ondent upon the following
facts:
Salt Lake City Corporatiop owns and operates a
municipal bathing resort, located at 840 North 2nd West
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the Wasatch
Springs Plunge.
That on the 26th day of June, 1963, the respondent
entered the said plunge for the purpose of sw~ng
therein. Mr. Elbert'B~ Rumsey, the respondent, was at
that time fifty-three years of age. (R. 163, lines 25 and
26.) While attempting to dive from the low diving board
in the north end of the swimming pool or plunge, he
injured his knee, ( R. 1 ~4) severing the patellar ligament. (R. 189 and R. 190.) After the accident the
respondent was taken from the Wasatch Springs
Plunge across the street to the St. Mark's Hospital
4
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(R. 165, lines 20 and 21) where Dr. Robert D. Morrow
(R. 137) operated on him, sewing the severed tendon
together. (R. 189 and R. 190.)
Mr. Rumsey was aV',ray from work because of the
injury for about two and one-half months (R. 170,
line 5) and lost one-half day's "\-vork for another month.
(R. 170, lines 8 and 9.)
The appellant claims that his injuries were due to
an exposed part of the aluminum diving board which
had worn bare on the end thereof of the safety walk.
Ross Ferrin, lifeguard at the Wasatch Springs Plunge,
testified that this worn part exposed only a part of the
end of the diving board. (R. 103, R. Ill, and exhibit
D-6). When the safety matting or safety walk was
replaced on the end of the diving board it covered much
more than the exposed area alleged to have been the
cause of the accident. (R. 121).
1\'Ir. Rumsey worked for Western Garden Center,
as a stockman (R. 181, lines 5 and 6) and earned approximately $37 5.00 per month. ( R. 170, line 2.)
On July 17, 1963, Mr. Rumsey claims to have
suffered a heart attack (R. 167, lines I and 2) and taken
to L.D.S. Hospital. (R. 167.)
After the verdict of the jury was made and entered
on May 5, 1964 (R. 63) the appellant moved for a judgment in its favor, notwithstanding the verdict, (R. 65,
66 and 67) and filed notice for hearing thereof within

5
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ten ( 10) days after entry of Judgment, to-wit, on May
21, 1964, (R. 74, 75 and 76) which motion was denied
by the court on the 3rd day of June, 1964. (R. 79 and
R. 80.)

On May 25, 1964, the respondent filed a motion to
clarify or amend the judgment or grant a new trial on
the issue of governmental immunity. (R. 71.) This was
one week after the entry of the judgment on the jury
verdict, ( R. 68) and ten ( 10) days after the verdict of
the jury had been rendered and entered and the jury
discharged. ( R. 63.)
The motion of the respondent was granted by the
court on the 3rd day of June, 1964, (R. 79 and R. 80)
and hearing thereon was heard by the court alone on
June_ 15, 1964, at which time the case was reopened and
new and further testimony given in the absence of the
jury over the objections of the appellant. (R. 191, R.
195, lines 1 to 12 inclusive. See proceedings of June 15,
1964.) (R. 191 to R. 209, inclusive.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT ALLEGE
OR PLEAD ANY FACTS SHOWING THAT
THE APPELLANT OPERATED THE WASATCH SPRINGS PLUNGE IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY.
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Before the respondent can recover from the appellant city, not only must it plead facts overcoming the
operation of the Wasatch Springs Plung~ as a governmental function, but must affirmatively plead that the
appellant city was operating the Wasatch Springs
Plunge in a proprietary capacity. r~rhis, the respondent
did not do. (R. I and R. 2.)
In Wade vs. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353
Pacific 2d 914, on page 915 of the Pac. Rep., this court
said:
"Nothing is alleged reflecting any other use
than that suggested, and we take it that any
purpose other than governmental must be pleaded and be free fro~m legislative inhibition:'~ (Emphasis added. )
"Action against a city by a county employee,
injured by lawn mower operated by a city employee while they were mowing city park. Law
appeal from judgment of common pleas court,
which sustained demurrer by city. The court of
appeals held plaintiff did not state a good cause
of action when sufficient facts were not alleged
to charge city was acting in a proprietary capacity.n (Emphasis added.) Ballanger vs. City of
Dayton, 1952, 117 N.E.2d 469.
Cities are organized as political subdivisions of the
state to exercise governmental functions locally within
their boundaries, and not for business purposes, the presumption being, unless pleaded .and proved to the contrary, that any activity undertaken by them is governr.aental and for the good of all of their inhabitants. Davis
vs. Provo City, 1 Utah 2d 244, 265 P.2d 415.

7
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"The rule is general that a municipal corporation is not liable for alleged tortious injuries to
the persons or property of individuals, when
engaged in the perfomance of public or governmental functions or duties. So far as municipal
corporations exercise powers conferred on them
for purposes essentially public, they stand as does
the sovereignty "vhose agents they are, and are
not liable to be sued for any act or omission occurring while in the exercise of such powers, unless by some statute the right of action be given."
Gillmor vs. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 89 P.
714, where this court cited with approval the
above quotation from American and English
Encyclopedia of Law, page 1193.
The motion of the appellant for a dismissal of the
respondent's cause of action should have been granted
by the lower court and judgment for the appellant made
and entered notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 65 and
R. 67.)
POINT II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND THE
RESPONDENT DID NOT PROVE THAT
THE PARTIALLY EXPOSED END OF THE
DIVING BOARD "WAS THE PROXIlVIATE
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.
One may search the record from beginning to end
in this case and will never discover any positive or substantial evidence connecting the accident and the resulting injuries of the respondent with the partially exposed
end of the diving board, as the cause of the accident and

8
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the appellant's injuries. (See respondent's own testimony. R. 164 and R. 165; R. 180 through R. 182; R.
183, line 1 through 12). No witness testified that he sa"v
the accident,and it is obvious from the respondent's own
testimony that he does not know what caused him to fall
except a self-serving conclusion. The exposed part of
the diving board was very small and so trivial as not
to cause an accident. (R. 103, lines 1 through 17.) (See
Exhibit D 6.) While the repaired area was twenty ( 20)
inches crosswise and fourteen ( 14) inches lengthwise,
the exposed metal area at the time of the accident measured only twelve ( 12) to fourteen ( 14) inches crosswise
and only three ( 3) to four ( 4) inches lengthwise of the
end of the diving board. ( R. 101, lines 27 through 30;
R. 103, lines 3 through 10.)
"An operator of a diving pool to which the
public is admitted on payment of admission is not
an insurer of the safety of the patrons but must
use reasonable care and diligence in furnishing
and 1naintaining the premises in a reasonably
safe condition for the purpose for which it is
designed and to which it is adapted, but is not
chargeable with negligence for failure to foresee
a possible injury rather than a probable one.n
Webb vs. Thomas, 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036.

"Even if defendant in the construction and
operating of a swimming pool where patron was
injured when he dived into the pool, there was
no liability for the patron's injuries unless the
alleged negligence of the proprietor was the
proximate cause thereof." Webb vs. Thomas
'
133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036.

9
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In Suarello vs. Coast Holding Co.,. (1934)., 242
App. Div. 802, 274 N.Y.S. 776, the owner of a swimming pool was held not liable for injuries received by a
patron who slipped and fell on a wet floor, the court
saying:
"The slippery condition of the platform surrounding the defendant's swimming pool was
necessarily incidental to the use of the bath. There
was no proof of the violation of any duty or obligation on the part of the defendant to provide
a covering for the floor at the point where the
plaintiff fell.''

"A municipality is not liable for a defect in its
premises unless the defect constitutes an unsafe
condition but is also of a substantial nature.~~
White vs. Standard Oil Company, Ohio App.
1962, 187 N.E.2d 504.
"Plaintiff's allegation of a defect in the pool,
without proof thereof creates. no liability, for
negligence is never presumed." Home Market
vs. N ewrock, I l l Colo. 428, 142 P.2d 272.
"The ·mere happening of the accident does not
raise a presumption of negligence." National Co.
vs. Holt, 137 Colo. 208, 322 P .2d 1046 ( 1958).
City of Au.rora vs. JoAnn L. Weeks, June 24,
1963, 384 P.2d 90.
"Fact that a large number of patrons had used
water slide located at the edge of swimming pool
in amusement park without mishap was evidence,
in action by patron against owner and operator
of park to recover for injuries sustained on water
slide, that water slide \vas not inherently dangerous." Hays vs. Glen Echo Park Co., 215 Fed.
2d 34.

10
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"In an action for injuries sustained by patron
when he dived into a swimming pool operated by
defendant, where patron dived in at the shallow
end where there was no diving board, evidence
that the pool had been used by many thousands
of persons without accident and that the water
where plaintiff's injuries occurred was three and
one-half feet deep established that the defendant
was not negligent in the maintenance of the
pool." Webb vs. Thomas, 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.
2d 1036.
"A person entering a public bathhouse operated by the state, owed a duty to the state while
on its premises to use ordinary care to a void
injury." Grifel vs. State, 110 N.Y.S.2d 739.
POINT Ill.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REOPENING THE CASE
TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
TESTIMONY
AFTER THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS
RENDERED AND ENTERED AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED,
THE
JURY
DISCHARGED AND THE RESPONDENT HAD
RESTED HIS CASE.
It is the opinion of counsel for the appellant that
counsel for the respondent never thought of producing
further testimony in this action until he was served with
a notice and motion of said appellant to grant it a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. ,-fhe appellant filed and served by mail on counsel for the respondent, such motion on the 21st day of May, 1964.
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thereafter on the 25th day of May, 1964, the respondent
filed a "motion to clarify or amend the judgment or
grant a new trial on the issue of governmental immunity." Counsel for the respondent alleges that he was
taken by surprise and that there was an agreement or
stipulation between counsel or that counsel for appellant
admitted that the respondent had alleged a good cause
of action. Counsel for the appellant emphatically denies
any such stipulation, agreement or admission.
Only some the of defenses set forth in the appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
were mentioned in the pretrial conference or incorporated in the pretrial order. The court made the order
and the appellant admits it is bound thereby, but nothing appears anywhere in the record to verify the contention of counsel for the respondent that counsel for
appellant made any agreements, stipulations or admissions outside those contentions incorporated in the pretrial order regarding the capacity in which the appellant operated the Wasatch Springs Plunge. There is
nothing in the motion of the respondent by way of surprise that counsel could not have guarded against
and prepared. His pleadings were defective in not
alleging the capacity in which Salt Lake City operated its municipal bath, anrl it was. nre.Judicial error
·
reSHOnaent s
for the court to, under the~ motion, to reopen
the jury trial, after verdict and judgment had been
rendered, and the respondent's case rested, to the detriment, prejudice and injury of the appellant's substantial rights.

12
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Rule 59 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
pertinent part here, provides as follows:
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided, however,
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a. jury~ the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions
of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:

"***"
Rule 59 (a) was not designed to reopen a case tried
by a jury after its verdict has been rendered and judgment thereon entered, but under its provisions, it is
respectfully submitted that such may be done only where
the case is tried to the court without a jury and one or
more of the grounds set forth in the rule alleged.
The only cases in Utah for reopening a case that
counsel has found appurtenant to the question at hand
are the following and all have been tried without a jury:
In an action to quiet title to certain real estate by
adverse possession, tried to the court only, the Supreme
Court held:
"The refusal of the trial court to grant a motion of the plaintiff to reopen to present additional evidence, after he had rendered his decision~ was well within his discretion." Bowen et
al. vs. Olson et al., 2 U.2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 at
page 986 of the Pacific Reporter.

13
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Plaintiff brought suit in District Court for Davis
County, Utah, for the purpose of enjoining the maintenance and operations of an oil refining plant on the
theory that it was a nuisance,. Supreme Court held:
"Case may be reopened after trial is closed,
formal decision announced and findings of fact
proposed." VV asatch Oil Refining Co. vs. 'lV ade
( 1936) ,. 63 p .2d 1070.
Footnote cases in ·which court cites for same principal are: Kinsman vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 U. 10,
177 P. 418, suit for injunction. Summers vs. Provo
Foundary and Machinery Co., 53 U. 320, 178 P. 916,
suit to recind a contract (equity) . Barboglio et al. vs.
Gibson et al. (1923), 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385, suit for
injunction.
Needham vs. First National Bank of Salt Lake
City, 96 U. 432, 85 P.2d 785. This was a suit on a note
tried to the court without a jury. Case was not reopened.
Kirkham vs. Spencer, 3 U.2d 399, 285 P.2d 127.
This was an action for unlawful detainer tried by court.
Court properly reopened case on its own motion under
Rule 59 (d).
Tuft vs. Brotherson, 106 U. 499, 150 P.2d 384.
This case was an action tried without a jury for breach
of sales contract. Motion to reopen case denied.

14
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted by virtue of the foregoing authorities, that the judgment of the lower court
should be reversed and the action against the appellant
disn1issed.
Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney
A. M. MARSDEN
Assistant City Attorney
414 City and County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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